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"We must conclude, perhaps with a 
shock of surprise, that our 
primitive actions, the ones we 
do not do by doing something 
else . . . these are all the 
actions there are. We never 
do more than move our bodies; 
the rest is up to nature." 
—Donald Davidson in "Agency" 
"An act of volition produces 
motion in our limbs, or raises 
a new idea in our imagination. 
This influence of the will we 
know by consciousness . . . . 
The motion of the body follows 
upon the command of the will." 
David Hume in the Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understandin; 
I. Actions as Causes. There is a view that certain 
expressions "designating actions or sentences asserting 
the occurence of actions can refer to the same action or 
assert the occurrence of the same action even though 
their senses are widely disparate. I shall dub this 
the "unifier thesis," hereafter UT. UT might identify, 
for example, Booth's shooting Lincoln with his killing 
Lincoln. Certain critics of UTl have fastened upon the 
absurdities of UT's alleged entailments in their efforts 
to demonstrate its falsity. Thus it has been argued 
that if Booth's shooting Lincoln is the same action as 
his killing Lincoln, then the latter must have taken 
place when the former did. So Lincoln must have been 
killed when he was shot; but we know Lincoln to have 
lingered on for several hours. UT entails that Lincoln 
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died before he died. I will assume in this essay that 
such criticisms have been satisfactorily met 2 and that 
UT cannot be rejected for the reasons usually given. I 
will later argue for its acceptance. 
The positive defense of UT however will rest upon 
a particular proposal regarding the appropriate analysis 
to be given action sentences. This proposal I will term 
the "causal analysis," hereafter CA.3 It seems to me 
that a fair amount of the disfavor in which UT is held 
has its source in the adoption of certain theories con-
cerning the analysis of action sentences which rule out 
from the start the intelligibility of UT. Some would 
maintain, for example, that an action is the exemplifi-
cation of an 11 action-property"4j hence, two action locu-
tions expressing different properties, such as "shooting" 
and "killing" cannot designate the same action. CA, on 
the other hand, renders "Booth shot Lincoln" and "Booth 
killed Lincoln" as "Booth did something which caused a 
gun to fire into Lincoln's body" and "Booth did some-
thing which caused Lincoln to die." On this model of 
analysis, the actions picked out by the two expressions 
may be the same. This is because the action is described 
solely in terms of its consequences. CA makes it neither 
plausible nor implausible that the actions which were 
the causes of these two distinct events are the same. 
This is one of the merits of CA in the context of 
defending UT. Obviously this is not an argument for 
the truth of CA. I wish now to do what I can by way of 
providing grounds for the adequacy of CA. 
I take the considerations for CA ' s tenability to 
have their roots in a partial analysis of the concept of 
action itself. Among other things, action is a causal 
notion. We say that a notion is causal if it is a 
concept of a k i n d of entity that by definition causes or 
brings about, o r has a t e n d e n c y t o cause or bring about, 
certain states or events. Thus the concept of poison 
is causal in that it is the notion of a kind of entity 
or substance which brings on illness or death, and so 
with the c o n c e p t of a magnet , as a magnet is the sort of 
thing which causes the movement of ferrous metal objects 
towards itself. Similarly, there is good reason to 
believe that action is a causal notion insofar as we 
understand action to be a kind of event that, barring 
special circumstances, results in various events or 
states. This f a c e t of the concept is evidenced by the 
tendency we have to explicate many action locutions in 
terms of "bringing about" or "causing." Thus, "shooting" 
and "killing" are easily so construed. Some perhaps will 
object here that whereas there may exist this inclina-
t i o n to s p e l l out a wide variety of e x p r e s s i o n s in such 
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terras, there is a host of expressions which do not so 
move us. Examples can be thought of easily; for example, 
"I promised." The thrust of the objection here I take 
to be that we have actions which are not causings. It 
is significant however that cases of this sort are, as 
far as I can tell, always instances of what have been 
called "nonbasic actions." The version of UT that I 
wish to defend is a strong one in that it denies there 
to be the commonly accepted distinction between basic and 
nonbasic actions. Such a contention is only seemingly 
perverse for it would not require the abandoning of the 
basic-nonbasic distinction; rather UT would hold this 
duo of properties to attach to descriptions of actions , 
and not actions themselves. Thus the principles that 
various theorists of action, e . g . Goldman (A Theory of 
Human Action, pp. 22-35) have offered for the generatTon, 
from basic actions and the circumstances in which they 
are performed, of nonbasic actions can be reinterpreted 
as tools for the production of nonbasic descriptions. 
On this account, the nonbasic descriptions are descrip-
tions of exactly the same thing the basic descriptions 
are descriptions of. The character of this common 
referent will be dealt with in III, IV, and V of this 
essay. What is crucial here however is that even 
opponents of such a view admit basic actions to be 
causings, such as the moving of a finger or a part of 
one's body in the case of physical action. If the above 
thesis can be made out to be reasonable, then it will 
not matter that there are noncausal descriptions of 
actions, for they will still be descriptions of causings. 
Another class of action descriptions supposedly resistant 
to the causal analysis are those designating so called 
"negative" actions i.e. various kinds of refrainings and 
forbearances. Without arguing so here, I take the above 
sketch of UT to be capable of providing a way of under-
s t a n d i n g these "not doings" to be c a u s i n g s as well. 
Of course if an action is thought of as the causing 
of our own bodily or mental states, it does not follow 
that only an action can cause such or that all actions 
must c a u s e physical or mental s t a t e s . The c o n c e p t of 
action does not demand this much any more than the con-
cept of poison logically requires that all illnesses or 
deaths are brought on by ingestion of poison or that if 
such ingestion does take place, illness or death must 
follow. If this latter were so, antidotes would not be 
able to do their job. Rather, given "normal" circum-
stances, actions cause bodily or mental states. 
II. Volition as Action. Reflection upon certain 
"abnormal" circumstances yields what I take to be 
c u r i o u s consequences for any theory of action. Con-
sider the now famous psychological experiment reported 
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by William James.5 The experimental subject was seated 
in a chair and blindfolded; one of his arms was anaes-
thetized and then so secured that it was impossible to 
budge. The experimenter then asked the subject, unaware 
that his arm was so restricted, to raise his arm over 
his head. The subject took himself to have obeyed the 
request. The blindfold was then removed and the subject, 
to his great surprise, observed the table-bound arm. 
Similar but grizzlier responses have been made by victims 
of sudden paralysis or injury upon discovery of their 
inert or missing members. 
It seems plausible, in fact reasonable, to contend 
that the above account suggests the subject to have 
indeed performed an action. While certainly there is 
dispute among philosophers regarding the necessary condi-
tions of action, there are a number of conditions which 
a great many would be willing to take as jointly suf-
ficient. That is, nothing can satisfy all of these 
conditions and yet fail to be an action. The above case 
appears to satisfy such. What are these conditions and 
how is this so? 
A common locution associated with the language of 
action is that of "doing." While certainly not every-
thing which can be said to have been done is an action, 
if something is an action then it is something done. 
The subject in James' experiment would have described 
himself as having done something. Now he may not have 
correctly described what he did i.e. before the blindfold 
was removed he might have said that he had raised his 
arm; but this is a different, although significant, 
point. Insofar as the person was able to describe him-
self as having done something, it is clear that he was 
aware of h a v i n g done SOMETHING, however it i s to be 
accurately described. But he is not only aware that he 
has done something but also that this something was done 
intentionally. This is so because what was done was 
done at the request of the experimenter. The subject 
intended to raise his arm in order to act upon the 
experimenter's r e q u e s t . Thus he i n t e n d e d to obey the 
request of the experimenter. And finally, this thing 
that was done was something over which the subject can 
be said to have had control. He clearly was not com-
pelled to do what he did; he could just as easily have 
sought to waste others' time by doing nothing. Given 
then that the subject was aware of having intentionally 
done something over which he had control, it is difficult 
to deny that the baffled subject performed an action, 
even in the midst of his motionlessness. 
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Now has James, in providing us with such an account, 
offered us.evidence for the existence of a kind of action 
peculiar to persons whose bodies are in abnormal states 
i.e. anaesthetized, paralyzed, or injured? To assert 
such would surely be artificial; for we would have to 
imagine that a novel sort of action comes into being 
only when ä person becomes injured or paralyzed; and 
just when use of the limb is regained the specified kind 
of action goes out of existence. Rather, if it can be 
soundly argued that the so-circumstanced people did per-
form actions, then it would be reasonable to hold that 
this sort of action occurs whenever a person acts so as 
to, say, move a part of his body or keep it in a certain 
state. Let us call this kind of action "volition." 
There are numerous philosophers nevertheless who 
claim that it is false that when, for example, we raise 
our arms any such action takes place, because no such 
action ever takes place. When we raise our arms we 
don't do anything of the sort mentioned, rather we just 
raise our arms and that's it. If this is taken to mean 
that we don't first "perform a volition" and then raise 
our arms (as we might pick up a stick and then throw it) , 
then it is unexceptionable. With respect to this denial 
by the opponent of volitions, I will simply assume that 
without the notion of volition we are left in the dark 
as to how to understand the sorts of phenomena mentioned 
by James and others. But more importantly, the objection 
assumes that we perfectly well understand what it is for 
us to raise an arm or move a leg or whatever. I think 
such confidence is unfounded and will soon argue that 
volition plays an essential role in our coming to see 
what an action such as raising an arm comprises. 
III. Action and Bodily Motion. Thus far I have argued 
that volition counts as action; such a thesis is of 
central concern in that I will later argue volition 
alone to count as action. Before undertaking such a 
defense however, it will be necessary to outline and 
criticize certain currently either explicitly or im-
plicitly adopted views on the character of a c t i o n . Now 
I wish to argue what action i s not. 
The most general form of the position to be here 
scrutinized I call the "bodily motion thesis." This 
thesis has two forms, a strict and a relaxed, h e r e a f t e r 
BMTS and BMTR. BMTS is the bald a s s e r t i o n that all 
actions are identical with bodily motions or movements. 
BMTR is the less rigid notion that all actions are 
identical either with bodily motions or with such and 
certain of their consequences or effects. (BMTR then 
can be seen as a species of the view regarding the rela-
tion of n o n b a s i c a c t i o n s to basic actions such that the 
former "contain" or " i n c l u d e " the latter.) 
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BMTS is open to a number of objections more and 
less damaging. Through the paper we will progress from 
the elementary to the more trenchant of difficulties for 
BMTS. Certain of these more elementary criticisms will 
be noted as familiar in that they are formally similar 
to criticisms of that version of behaviorism which seeks 
to identify mental events with bodily movements. Let us 
look at some of these. We commonly think that certain 
actions take place when no movement of the body, or at 
least none which appears relevant to the performance of 
the action, occurs. There are at least two kinds of 
such action, which the following will illustrate. Con-
sider a scenario in which John Wilkes Booth waits motion-
lessly outside the box in Ford's theatre where President 
Lincoln is seated. Booth is anticipating exactly the 
appropriate moment at which to enter, running through 
"in his head" for the final time his plan of escape 
following the assault. 
First, most would take Booth here to have engaged 
in action by "running through" his scheme; the action is 
of a special sort, a "mental" action. Now with what 
bodily movement are we to identify this action? Ex 
hypothesi no bodily movement is occurring, or at least 
none that seems relevant to the action described. Thus 
suppose Booth to have swayed nervously from side to side 
while he plotted. Would this bodily agitation have been 
his scheming? One could attempt to escape this dif-
ficulty by denying that Booth was acting, that mental 
a c t i o n s are not "fullfleged" actions. But this seems 
counterintuitive. We think that to plot or scheme in 
the fashion of Booth is something one can be aware of 
doing, doing intentionally and having control over. In 
short there seems to be no good reason for denying there 
to be a c t i o n here. 
A second tack for skirting the difficulty is the 
interesting but dialectically premature maneuver of 
identifying actions with events occurring in the brain. 
Thus, in order to preserve BMTS in the face of this 
elementary counterexample of the mental action, the 
mental event is claimed to be a brain event. This may 
be of use for the mental action but how does it aid us 
in our understanding of an action like raising an arm? 
Will it too be identified with such an event or process? 
Perhaps it can be, but it would appear that a number of 
other issues must be raised for us to be able to under-
stand why someone might wish to make the identification 
at this point. The motivation for equating mental 
actions with brain processes, i.e. adherence to a view 
which holds every mental event, of which mental action 
is a species, to be a brain process, does not seem, at 
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least at this stage of the argument, to be appropriate 
for identifying physical actions like the raising of an 
arm with brain processes. More will be said later about 
the connection between the identity theory of mind and 
the theory of human action I wish to propose. 
The second kind of action which provides at least 
prima facie difficulty for BMTS is exhibited in the same 
Booth-Lincoln encounter. This is the sort of action 
which does not appear to involve any bodily movement. 
When Booth lingered outside the box, keeping his body 
as still as possible, was he not, in so doing, acting? 
After all, the less movement made, the more successful 
he was. This point reminds us that while many bodily 
actions are causings of bodily movement, some are not; 
for some concern the maintenance of a bodily state or the 
cessation of bodily movement. This remark provides 
supporters of BMTS the opportunity to make their principle 
more credible. Thus, "bodily movement" can be interpreted 
broadly enough, although perhaps misleadingly, to cover 
in its scope relevant bodily states. BMTS then is the 
view that all actions are either movements or states of 
the body or of one or some of its parts. Whether such 
emendation can be responsive to BMTS1 more serious dif-
ficulties will be taken up in a little while. 
We now for the moment turn to BMTR, the less radical 
and more widely accepted of the "bodily state" variations. 
Take again the example of Booth's killing Lincoln. It 
is considered by a fair number that this action begins 
with Booth's pressing his finger against the trigger of 
the gun and terminates in and includes Lincoln's death. 
The assassination then is a very ".long" or "extended" 
action. The impetus for wanting to give this action 
such a temporal span, can be found, at least in part I 
think, in considerations of the following sort. Since 
Booth cannot be said to have killed Lincoln until 
Lincoln dies , the action cannot have ended until 
Lincoln has died. This inference however is invalid. 
While it is true that Booth cannot be said to have kill-
ed Lincoln until Lincoln has died, it does not follow 
that the action which is only at Lincoln's demise 
describable as a "killing" has not already taken place 
in its entirety; i.e. it does not follow that Lincoln's 
death must be a part of the action (cf. Vollrath, p. 334; 
and Davidson, p. 2 3f.) In the following an argument 
will be presented to demonstrate that we are not only 
not forced to infer that Lincoln's death must be included 
in the action of killing, but that we cannot so infer 
because it is false. And so it will be urged that BMTR 
is false. 
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The most cogent articulation of the argument I take 
to be decisive against BMTR has been laid out by Donald 
Davidson in his paper, "Agency" (pp. 21-22). CThe 
argument, as there formulated, is carried out in the 
terminology of "basic" and "nonbasic" actions; Davidson's 
intention is to argue that all actions are basic actions. 
I mention earlier in the essay (p. 45) the manner in 
which I would handle the notions of basic and nonbasic, 
i.e. as properties of descriptions. This is, verbally 
at least, at odds with Davidson's account. Nevertheless 
the force of his argument, mutatis mutandis, remains.] 
Lincoln's death should not be countenanced as part of 
the action of Booth's killing Lincoln since whatever 
action that is the killing has been performed, in all of 
its "completeness," prior to Lincoln's death. This is 
so because after Booth has moved his finger against the 
trigger of the gun, there is, with respect the killing 
of Lincoln, nothing left for him to do. To paraphrase 
Davidson, Booth has done his work; it is left for 
nature to do its. 
That this is the case can be made clearer if we add 
a point of fiction to the Booth-Lincoln story. Thus 
suppose Booth to have suffered an instantly fatal heart 
attack as soon as he fired the gun. Persons cannot 
continue to perform actions after they are dead. Conse-
quently, whatever the action was which was the killing 
of Lincoln by Booth cannot have terminated at Lincoln's 
death since this would, I take it, require someone to 
be performing the action in the while between the gun ' s 
firing and Lincoln's death. The same point can be made 
in another way. History tells us that Booth in fact 
did not die at the theatre, but rushed furiously from 
that place, mounted a horse, and fled the city. If 
the action were t o have begun at the time of the finger-
moving and ended a t t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s death, it mus/t have 
been taking place at all times in between. This would 
entail that while Booth was desperately speeding from 
town, he was continuing to perform the action of killing 
Lincoln. But this is surely implausible to suppose. 
Nor would it matter if a penitent Booth had maintained 
a bedside vigil with the wounded statesman. Whatever 
action Booth performed which was the killing had since 
passed. 
IV. Davidson and BMTS. Davidson himself, in "Agency," 
subscribes to a version of BMTS. He there claims that 
i f the idea of bodily movement is interpreted generously 
(perhaps in the manner suggested above?), then all prim-
i t i v e actions are bodily movements. Given that he takes 
primitive actions, i.e. basic actions, to be the only 
actions there are, it follows that he adopts BMTS. 
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In order to gain some insight into the character of 
Davidson's position let us look at a probing question he 
anticipates being put to him regarding the thesis that 
all primitive actions are bodily movements. It goes 
something like as follows: in order to point my finger, 
I do something which causes my finger to move, e.g. 
contract certain muscles-, and perhaps this requires that 
I make happen certain events in my brain. But such 
actions do not sound like at least ordinary bodily 
movements. 
Davidson provides a curious response to the above, 
so I will quote it in full: 
I think that the premises to this argument 
may be true, but that the conclusion does 
not follow. It may be true that I cause 
the finger to move by contracting certain 
muscles, and possibly I cause the muscles 
to contract by making an event occur in my 
brain. But this does not show that pointing 
my finger is not a primitive action, for it 
does not show that I must do something which 
causes it. Doing something that causes my 
finger to move does not cause me to move my 
finger; it is_ moving my finger, (p. 23) 
This reply is odd for a number of reasons. First, 
Davidson seems to be employing as a necessary condition 
for an action's being basic that it not be caused by 
another action. This is evidenced by the penultimate 
sentence of the response. But there has been sufficient 
criticism of this principle.^ Secondly, if Davidson's 
stance with regard to nonbasic actions is correct, then 
any description of an action will be a description of a 
basic action. Thus, on Davidson's view, not only must 
moving my finger be a basic action, but so also must be 
my contracting certain muscles and making some event 
occur in my brain. To be consistent it appears that 
Davidson must hold that contracting certain muscles 
with the result that my finger moves is_ moving my finger; 
and that making an event occur in my brain with the 
result that my muscles contract is_ contracting my muscles. 
Thus making an event occur in my brain is_ moving my 
finger. It follows that, as expressions referring to an 
action, "making an event occur in my brain," "contracting 
my muscles" and "moving my finger" are coreferential. 
Davidson's reply to the original query is, at least 
in part, responsive to that aspect of the question re-
garding the primitiveness of moving my finger, but it is 
still not clear with what bodily movement this action is 
identical, i.e. what bodily movement is the referent of 
"moving my finger?" Let us consider the possibilities. 
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Could the referent be the finger movement itself? Some 
philosophers hold to this view, but its difficulties run 
deep. How could the action which is the moving of my 
finger be the finger movement if the action is to be 
understood as that thing which I did which caused the 
finger movement? This would be to identify the cause 
and its effect. This very same line of reasoning would 
show that the referent of "contracting certain muscles" 
cannot be the event of the muscles' contracting and that 
the designation of "making a certain brain event occur" 
cannot be the brain event. What we do is not what we 
cause; rather our doings are our causings. 
Perhaps a partial explanation for confusing these 
lies in the possible ambiguity of the expression "what 
a person does." There is some precedent for taking what 
a person does as that which he causes or brings about. 
Thus imagine me forgetting to return the typewriter 
carriage to the next line after completion of a line 
and typing over the same line again. Suppose'that I 
don't notice this mess and hand the page to someone 
for proofreading. He points to the jumble on the page 
and says, "Look what you did!" This is an interesting 
extension of the concept of action but surely a secondary 
and parasitic one. 
Assuming the above form of argument is successful, 
perhaps someone will say the following: if the action 
in question is identical with that the causing of which 
is the action, surely it at least includes as one of 
its constituents what is brought about or caused. Thus 
the finger movement is part of the action of moving my 
finger. But Davidson himself-has given us reasons for 
rejecting this move. Recall what he would say concerning 
the relation of Lincoln's death to the action of killing 
Lincoln. The action description "Booth's killing of 
Lincoln" is generated through one of the action's effects 
i.e. Lincoln's dying; but we are not to say that the 
referent of the description actually includes Lincoln's 
dying since the referent would be the action which 
causes his dying. Causes do not include their effects. 
So not only are the finger movement, the muscle contrac-
tion, and the brain event not identical with the action 
of moving the finger, contracting the muscles, and making 
a brain event occur, neither are they constituents of . 
such. What bodily movement then is it that is the action 
in this case? Whether in fact some form of BMTS can be 
salvaged is an issue to which we will return. 
V. Action as Volition. I now wish to return to an ex-
amination of that event earlier termed "volition," which 
was argued to count as action. I now wish to defend the 
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claim that volition constitutes action, i.e. volition 
alone is action. 
We saw previously that a Davidsonian argument would 
have it that Booth's "killing Lincoln" is a description 
of the action described as Booth's "moving his finger 
against the trigger of his gun" since once Booth had so 
moved his finger there was literally nothing more for 
HIM to do with respect to causing Lincoln's death. Now 
why Ts it that primacy of" description would be given to 
"moving his finger?" After all, Davidson says that he 
is at least willing to consider the possibility that 
this description has the same referent as "contracting 
certain muscles" and "making a brain event occur." Why 
is it not said that once the brain event has been made 
to take place, there is nothing more for Booth to do with 
respect to killing Lincoln, or for that matter with re-
gard to causing the finger movement? 
The bearing the above has on the claim that volition 
alone is action is this: once the act of volition has 
been performed, there is nothing left for Booth to do 
with respect to his making an event occur in his brain, 
contracting certain muscles, moving his finger, pulling 
the trigger of the gun, shooting Lincoln, and, ultimate-
ly, killing Lincoln. Booth, in performing the volition 
has acted; we await the course of nature, i.e. physiology 
and gun mechanics, for means of describing the action 
through its effects. 
It is here that one can see the utility of UT and 
CA for the theory of volition as action and action as 
volition. This view is in accord with Davidson's in 
that the referents of the diverse action descriptions 
are taken as identical; however it conflicts with BMTS 
insofar as the latter requires our identifying the 
action variously described with any of the bodily 
motions so far mentioned. 
VI. Volitions as Mental Events. Thus far I have 
sketched volition as action, but said little else about 
its character. What sort of event is it? Just as I 
provided a number of conditions to indicate volition to 
be action, so now I want to provide reasons for taking 
volition to be a kind of mental event. 
Consider first the manner in which volition is 
known to occur when it is known to occur. Let us take 
as our focus of attention James' experimental subject. 
He did not find it necessary to observe any motion of his 
body or disposition of his internal organs, nor, obvious-
ly, did he have to ask anyone if he had done such a 
thing. Of course he would have been surprised if he had 
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asked, while blindfolded, whether his arm had risen, and 
been told that he had not raised his arm. But the 
experimenters could not have told him that he had done 
nothing, for they were in no position to do so. Their 
knowledge of the occurence of any such event seems like 
that we have of the occurence .in others of various 
sensations, mental images, and thinkings. In short we 
seem to possess privileged access in our own case to 
these events. 
I do not take this to entail that if we do perform 
a volition then we must be aware of its occurence in this 
special way; for it seems that there are many cases where 
we must infer to their occurence, using the same kinds 
of evidence others would use. But when we are aware in 
the way the experimental subject was aware we do not 
have to seek evidence. Now whether it makes sense to 
say that we can believe ourselves to be engaging in 
volition but not actually be doing so is debatable. 
But it is debatable in the same way that like ques-
tions regarding pains and thoughts are so. 
Further, this sort of awareness we have with respect 
to volition, which again is like that we have of our 
mental states, serves to explain how it is that we know 
that we are raising our arms when we are raising our arms 
as opposed to simply experiencing the motion of our arm. 
When the notion of volition was introduced in this essay 
originally, a certain objection was anticipated. This 
criticism denied the existence of volition in cases of 
arm raising, for the sake of claiming that we just raise 
our arms and do nothing else. I there said that this is 
true if it is to be understood as meaning that we don't 
first perform a volition and then raise the arm. But 
on my account, the action referred to by the description 
" r a i s i n g my arm" i s my volition. When we are aware of 
o u r s e l v e s r a i s i n g our arms we are c e r t a i n l y aware of 
something more than the simple motion of the arm. And 
what we are aware of which guarantees our belief that we 
are performing the action of raising the arm cannot be 
simply our knowledge of the intention we had to raise 
the arm plus the experience of our arms motion, for, in 
Hugh McCann's pithy comment, "Intentions are not their 
own execution."7 How then are we to explain our knowledge 
of the distinction between the movement of the arm and 
our moving i t i f not through the awareness of volition? 
These considerations then lead us to include volition in 
that class of events called "mental." 
In closing this section I want to make a last com-
ment on BMTS. In construing volition to be mental it 
should be made clear that I do not take such to rule 
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out the possible truth of some form of the identity 
theory of mind. It is in this way, and I think only 
in this way that BMTS may be true. Its vindication 
rests ultimately upon that of the identity theory. And 
it is for this reason that I took any attempt to identify 
action with a brain event before volition as mental event 
was defended to be dialectically premature. And at this 
stage of the controversy over the identity theory, it is 
perhaps premature to adopt BMTS. 
VII. Conclusion. If it be admitted that volitions are 
mental events , then there must be some way of distinguish-
ing them from other such occurrences such as sensations, 
thoughts , and most importantly from that with which they 
are often confused, intentions. This is a difficult and 
complex task, but one which must be undertaken if voli-
tion is to be something more than an "I know not what" 
which causes bodily and other mental states. I will not 
attempt any such thing here. 
A final remark upon a perhaps unnoticed advantage 
this theory possesses. It will be apparent in pursuing 
a good deal of the literature on action that quite a 
number of philosophers preface their account with an 
apology that space or some other factor does not permit 
the handling of what we ordinarily call "mental actions." 
(If I had thought to do so, I would have done the same!) 
Perhaps the abundance of such comments is not entirely 
accidental; for given the widespread equation of action, 
in the context of bodily action, with bodily movement, 
it is not easy to see what bodily movements could have 
in common with mental events or states to warrant 
designating them both as "action." If the same tack 
which is frequently taken for physical action is used to 
deal with mental action then we must identify the mental 
action with, say in the case of an imagining, the image 
produced and not the producing of the image. But if 
such a move is implausible with respect to bodily 
action, then it is also for mental action. Seeing 
actions, both physical and mental, as mental events which 
are causes of bodily events or states (bodily action) 
and mental events or states (mental action) points a way 
towards at least a unified ontology of action. 
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